LONDON: Speaking at the NATO summit in The Hague on Wednesday, US President Donald Trump indicated that the door is open to diplomacy with Iran, just days after he ordered B-2 bombers to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.

Trump once more hailed what he calls the 鈥渕assive, precision strike鈥� on three of Iran鈥檚 nuclear sites, Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, on June 22, adding that 鈥渘o other military on Earth could have done it.鈥�

His comments followed claims in a leaked assessment by the US Defense Intelligence Agency suggesting the US strikes had failed to destroy Iran鈥檚 stockpile of enriched uranium or its centrifuges 鈥� succeeding only in setting back the program mere months.

In response to the leaked report, Trump doubled down on earlier statements that Tehran鈥檚 nuclear program had been 鈥渙bliterated.鈥� He went on to say 鈥渨e鈥檙e going to talk鈥� with Iran next week, adding they may sign an agreement.

Asked if Washington is planning to lift sanctions on Iran, Trump said the Iranians 鈥渏ust had a war鈥� and they 鈥渇ought it bravely,鈥� adding that China can buy oil from Iran if it wants, as the country will 鈥渘eed money to get back into shape.鈥�

Whether Trump鈥檚 comments are a sign that the US intends to draft a new nuclear deal with Iran remains to be seen. What such a deal might look like in the wake of the past fortnight鈥檚 events is also anyone鈥檚 guess. One thing that is clear is that diplomacy seems the only viable option.

It was almost 10 years ago, on July 14, 2015, that representatives of the US, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, EU and Iran gathered in Vienna to finalize the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known simply as the Iran nuclear deal.

In exchange for sanctions relief, among other things, Iran agreed to limit enrichment of a reduced stockpile of 300 kg of uranium to 3.7 percent 鈥� insufficient to produce a bomb but aligned with its claims that its nuclear program was designed solely for generating electricity.

The architect of the deal, which was several years in the making, was US President Barack Obama, who said 鈥減rincipled diplomacy and 鈥� America鈥檚 willingness to engage directly with Iran opened the door to talks.鈥�

Within three years, the deal was in ruins, undone by Obama鈥檚 successor, Donald Trump.

According to inspectors from the UN鈥檚 International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, Iran had been sticking to its side of the bargain. But on May 8, 2018, during his first term as president, Trump unilaterally terminated America鈥檚 participation in the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions.

Iran, he said, had 鈥渘egotiated the JCPOA in bad faith, and the deal gave the Iranian regime too much in exchange for too little.鈥�

This week, in the wake of Israel鈥檚 surprise attack targeting the heart of Iran鈥檚 nuclear program 鈥� and Trump鈥檚 equally surprise decision to join in 鈥� the prospect of reviving any kind of deal with Tehran might seem distant, at best.

But some analysts believe that a new nuclear rapprochement between the US and Iran could be closer than ever 鈥� and not only despite the clashes of the past two weeks, but perhaps because of them.

Ibrahim Al-Marashi, associate professor in the Department of History at California State University San Marcos, said there was no doubt that 鈥渁mong the Iranian public, previously ambivalent about the nuclear issue, the optics of being bombed for programs still under IAEA inspection may rally new domestic support for pursuing a deterrent.鈥�

Furthermore, the attacks by Israel and the US have also 鈥渄egraded the credibility of international institutions such as the IAEA.

鈥淲hen countries that comply with inspections and international law are attacked anyway, it undermines the incentive structure that sustains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime, NPT, which Iran ratified in 1970, and the Islamic Republic of Iran endorsed in 1996.

鈥淲hy sign treaties or allow inspectors in if they do not shield you from military coercion? This is a dangerous message.鈥�

But, he added, 鈥渄iplomatic alternatives were, and still are, available鈥� and, for all its flaws, the JCPOA model is not a bad one to consider.

鈥淭he 2015 deal, although imperfect, successfully rolled back large portions of Iran鈥檚 nuclear program and subjected it to the most intrusive inspection regime in the world,鈥� he said.

鈥淚ts collapse was not inevitable; it was a political choice, dismantled by unilateral US withdrawal. Efforts to revive the deal have sputtered, and with the bombs falling the path back to diplomacy looked more distant than ever.

鈥淏ut it is the only path that has worked before 鈥� and the only one likely to work again.鈥�

But only with key adjustments.

As 萝莉视频 and other members of the GCC argued at the time, the JCPOA 鈥� put together in great secrecy and without consulting the Gulf states 鈥� was insufficiently tough and always doomed to fail.

Now experts argue that a return to diplomacy is not only vital for the stability of the region but that any new nuclear deal must be framed with the direct input of those states most exposed to the consequences of diplomatic failure: the Arab Gulf states.

鈥淎ll that is true,鈥� said Sir John Jenkins, former UK ambassador to 萝莉视频, Iraq and Syria.

鈥淭he core point is that the JCPOA bought us between 10 and 15 years, depending on the issue and the associated sunset clause. That was designed to provide time for a new regime to be put in place to contain and deter Iran after the JCPOA expired 鈥� which would now only be five years away.

鈥淏ut the Obama administration, followed by the E3 (the security coalition of the UK, Germany and France), seemed to think that once it had been signed it was such a wonderful achievement that they could turn to other things entirely. That was a mistake.

鈥淭his time it needs to be different. And there is an opportunity to start constructing a new security order in the region which involves regional states from the moment of creation rather than as some afterthought.鈥�

Jim Walsh, senior researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology鈥檚 Security Studies Program, is adamant that when Trump pulled the plug in 2018, 鈥渢he JCPOA was already working.

鈥淓very intelligence agency said that Iran was in compliance with the agreement and I defy you to find one serious entity that was charging that Iran was in violation of the JCPOA in the three years from 2015 to 2018.

鈥淭hey even hung on to their end of the bargain after Trump pulled out, for a solid year, until it was politically untenable.鈥�

The IAEA had large teams of inspectors on the ground, Iran had agreed to requirements that no country had ever agreed to before, 鈥渁nd this was consistent with what people in my trade would call a capability or latency decision.鈥�

This meant 鈥測ou have the option so that you can move in that direction if you need to, but you do not cross the line because the costs of crossing it are higher than the benefits.鈥�

And, he says, despite all that has happened since, especially in the past fortnight, Iran is fundamentally in the same place today 鈥� ready to deal.

鈥淲hat is Iran鈥檚 leverage here in negotiations with the IAEA or with the Europeans or with the Americans? It鈥檚 that they can turn the dial up on enrichment and turn it down, and they can install advanced centrifuges and then take them apart.

鈥淭his is part of a political game, because they don鈥檛 have a lot of ways to put leverage on their opponents.鈥�

He believes that if Iran really wanted an actual bomb, rather than the threat of one as a bargaining chip, it would have had one by now.

鈥淧roducing highly enriched uranium is the technically hardest part of the project, and moving to weaponization is more of an engineering problem.鈥� The fact that Iran has not done so is the real clue to the way ahead.

鈥淚鈥檝e worked for 20 years to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but it would be hard to argue that they don鈥檛 have some justification. Let鈥檚 be super clear: the country that鈥檚 attacking them, Israel, is a nuclear state.

鈥淏ut if they wanted to build a bomb, they鈥檝e had 18 years to do so, so someone has to explain to me why that hasn鈥檛 happened.

鈥淎s far back as 2007 the director of US national intelligence said Iran had the technical wherewithal to build a weapon, and the only remaining obstacle was the political will to do so.鈥�

And, despite Trump鈥檚 claim that the US attacks had 鈥渙bliterated鈥� the Iranian nuclear program, political will may still be all that is preventing Iran becoming a nuclear state.

Dan Sagir, an Israeli researcher and lecturer on the topic of Israel鈥檚 own nuclear deterrence and its impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, says that if the US and Iran do return to the talks that were already underway when Israel launched 鈥淥peration Rising Lion鈥� on June 12, 鈥渁ny deal that emerges is not going to be as solid as the previous one.鈥�

鈥淪o Trump bombed Fordow,鈥� said Sagir. 鈥淏ut where is the 400 kg of highly enriched uranium? The Iranians, who are very talented in this field, will say, 鈥榊ou bombed it. You buried it.鈥� But do we know that鈥檚 correct? We鈥檒l never know.

鈥淚f they still have it, they can get the bomb within a year. If they don鈥檛 have it, it鈥檚 two-and-a-half years. In any case, the game is not over.鈥�

In fact, said Walsh of MIT, there is 鈥渆very indication鈥� that the uranium, which the IAEA says has been enriched to a near-weapons-grade 60 percent 鈥� a claim dismissed by Iran as based on 鈥渇orged documents provided by the Zionist regime鈥� 鈥� is not buried within the Fordow complex.

鈥淚n May, Iran鈥檚 foreign minister warned the IAEA that they would take precautions. On June 13, the head of Iran鈥檚 Atomic Energy Organization also said they were going to take action, and on that day, according to satellite imagery, a convoy of trucks was outside Fordow, and the next day they were gone.

鈥淪o I would guess that they still have a lot of nuclear material somewhere that they could very quickly upgrade to weapons-grade material (which requires 90 percent enrichment).鈥�

Whether or not the current fragile ceasefire between Israel and Iran lasts, details emerging of America鈥檚 attack on Fordow and the other Iranian nuclear facilities appear only to reinforce the conclusion that a new nuclear deal with Iran is the only way forward.

鈥淵ou cannot bomb the knowledge of how to build a centrifuge out of the heads of the Iranians,鈥� said Walsh. 鈥淵ou can鈥檛 bomb away 18 years of experience.

鈥淭his is a big, mature program and dropping a few bombs isn鈥檛 going to change that. You can blow up equipment, and kill scientists, but we鈥檙e not talking about Robert Oppenheimer (the US physicist who led the team that made the first atomic bomb) in 1945.

鈥淭hey鈥檝e been at this for 18 years and now we鈥檙e at the management phase, not at the invention stage. They鈥檙e going to be able to reconstitute that program if they want to. There is no military solution to this problem.鈥�